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Abstract: This paper explores how legal liability in the IPO context can
impact an entrepreneur’s decision of whether and how to take a firm public.
Liability under the Securities Act of 1933 effectively embeds a put option in an
IPO security, where the entrepreneur must insure the shareholder against poor
firm performance, which inflates the price of the security and exposes the
entrepreneur to risk. This may cause IPO firms to appear to underperform
relative to non-IPO firms as the option value decays, and may lead the
entrepreneur to undertake strategic (but destructive) responses to minimize the
put value and his exposure to risk. Because of the value-destroying
characteristics of these responses—which include initial underpricing,
entrenchment, lower NPV projects, asset partitioning, and reduced
disclosure—this state of affairs is inefficient compared to a system where the
entrepreneur can simply allocate the risk to shareholders. While the Securities
Act’s risk-allocation regime may provide some benefits in the form of more
accurate disclosure, the availability of substitute responses by the
entrepreneur makes any such benefit uncertain.
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I.A.

Introduction
When an entrepreneur, who has founded a firm and developed its

business, decides to take his firm public in an initial public offering (IPO), the
entrepreneur gets to choose many things about the firm’s initial set-up. For
instance, he may decide to embed takeover protection in the firm’s charter,
retain voting control and issue only non-voting stock, or partition the firm’s
assets and sell only a part thereof to the public shareholders. This choice is
subject to the shareholder’s valuation of the resulting structure: a
shareholder will be willing to pay more or less for the firm’s shares depending
on whether she finds the entrepreneur’s choice agreeable. With this ability to
bargain, in general we expect to see the selling entrepreneur and purchasing
shareholders reach efficient outcomes in the structure and form of the firm
and the firm’s IPO.
One such area of bargaining between entrepreneur and shareholder
involves the assignment of risk. Because the entrepreneur lacks the ability to
diversify away idiosyncratic risk, while the shareholder can diversify
completely, the firm is actually worth more in the hands of the shareholder
than it is in the hands of the entrepreneur. Thus, when the entrepreneur
sells a share of the firm to the shareholder, one basic area of agreement
between the two is that the shareholder will bear the risk on the shares that
she purchases. This is perhaps such an obvious concept as to appear almost
trivial: we suppose that when a shareholder purchases shares of, say, IBM on
the open market, the shareholder is fully aware that she bears the risk of a
decline in the value of those shares.
It is the argument of this paper, however, that the U.S. securities laws
do not allow this simple risk-sharing bargain to be struck in the IPO context,1
with negative consequences for shareholder and entrepreneur alike. The
While “seasoned” issuers—those who are already public companies—are also subject to
1933 Act liability for the public sale of securities, the rules that apply to them are somewhat
different, and much more limited in practical application, than to IPO firms. See infra nn. 23,
60 and accompanying text.
1
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reason is that the material misstatement or omission liability standard of
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 effectively grants the shareholder the
right to “put” back the shares to the entrepreneur for their purchase price in
the bad state of the world where the firm performs poorly. The shareholder
relies on information—including the entrepreneur’s expectations about future
performance—provided by the entrepreneur to make her purchase decision,
and if, in hindsight, this information appears to have been wrong, the
shareholder has the legal right to recover her losses from the firm, wiping out
the entrepreneur’s stake. The entrepreneur ends up bearing idiosyncratic
risk that could be more efficiently borne by the shareholder. There are two
principal implications of this risk allocation.
First, because the shareholder is purchasing not just the firm’s equity
but also a put option exercisable in the bad state of the world, the
shareholder will pay more for the share-cum-option than she would have for
just the share. This means that the firm initially appears to be valued in
excess of the net present value of its future cash flows, and, over time, as the
value of the option component of the security declines, the firm will tend to
appear

to

underperform

relative

to

non-IPO

firms.

This

relative

underperformance is exacerbated when the shareholder exercises her put
option in the bad state of the world, which will pull assets out of the firm.
Underperformance of IPOs, which has sometimes been held up as evidence of
market inefficiency, may in fact be an artifact of regulatory distortion.
Second, and more importantly, because this allocation of risk is
undesirable to the entrepreneur, the entrepreneur may undertake a number
of strategic responses to attempt to minimize his exposure to the firm’s
idiosyncratic risk. These actions could involve initial underpricing of the IPO,
managerial entrenchment, choosing lower value (but safer) business projects,
investments in insurance or hedging transactions, partitioning of assets,
refraining from disclosure of positive information about the firm in the IPO
prospectus, or firm-level diversification (“empire-building”). Most of these
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activities have the potential to destroy value, and lead to outcomes that are
inefficient compared to allowing the entrepreneur and shareholder to allocate
risk between them as they choose.
B.

A Note on This Paper’s Contribution to the Literature

The chief aim of this paper is to describe the effect that securities
liability has on the incentives of the entrepreneur and the firm from an ex
ante perspective, providing a linkage between the public capital raising
process and the nature and structure of the public firms that result. This is
something on which relatively little has been written. While some have
argued in very general terms that overly harsh liability or an overly litigious
environment may keep issuers from the public markets in favor of, inter alia,
private or offshore deals,2 they do not consider the entrepreneur’s broad
range of dynamic responses to the threat of litigation. This paper fills that
gap, and finds that these responses are themselves potentially quite harmful.
More broadly, this paper bears upon the merits of the Securities Act
itself, and so weighs in on a question the legal literature has widely
discussed: whether mandatory disclosure laws are justified.3 While this paper
does not discuss the potential costs and benefits4 of a private-ordering system
See, e.g., Alexander (1991) at 571.
The traditional position argues that securities laws serve to protect investors, who are
plagued by bounded rationality at the individual or even market level. For modern
incarnations of this view, see, e.g., Stout (2003); Prentice (2002). In opposition, marketoriented scholars have argued that a system of private ordering, or at least regulatory
competition, is preferable to mandatory federal regulation. For instance, Roberta Romano
argues that securities regulation should be devolved to the states, Paul Mahoney argues that
securities regulation should be devolved to the exchanges, and Stephen Choi argues that
securities regulation should be devolved to private parties (though he would require the
licensing of investors). See Mahoney (1997), Romano (1998), Choi (2000).
4 A somewhat less developed, though interesting, line of argument, has taken the position
that mandatory disclosure schemes may have a place even in rational and efficient markets,
if there are network effects from uniform regulation, or significant externalities from issuer
disclosure. Easterbrook and Fischel, for instance, discuss the public goods aspect of
disclosure; were disclosure an opt-in affair, issuing firms would rationally choose to free-ride
off the disclosure of others. John Coates (2001) takes a somewhat different tack in proposing
that mandatory disclosure requirements, in their present form, prevent a future political
backlash against public corporations and securities firms. Allen Ferrell (2004) considers that
2
3
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of disclosure, instead taking the mandatory disclosure regime as given, this
paper does elaborate upon the costs that a one-size-fits-all system of
mandatory disclosure and risk-shifting can impose upon issuing firms and
shareholders. Describing these costs, including the strategic maneuvers by
the entrepreneur to affect the firm’s structure or capitalization, forms the
bulk of this paper, to be found in Parts III and IV.
This paper also considers the issue of how, exactly, current liability
rules function. This inquiry bears on a major question the literature has
addressed: whether the litigation mechanism for imposing securities liability
is “broken.” This literature, which developed around Janet Cooper
Alexander’s seminal 1991 article,5 argues positively that the underlying
existence of fraud or material inaccuracy appears uncorrelated with
settlement outcomes.6 The so-called “strike suit,” where a decline in share
price, by itself, leads to significant settlement amounts, is ostensibly evidence
of brokenness.7 I argue, in contrast, that, from a Bayesian point of view, a
decline in share price should be a major factor in deciding whether inaccurate
disclosure occurred, and in some cases could be the only factor necessary to
established firms may, in the absence of a mandatory disclosure regime, intentionally
disclose less in order to raise the cost of capital for potential market-entrant competitors,
who would be able to free ride off this disclosure.
5 See Alexander (1991). While the statistical significance of the findings from Alexander’s
data is questionable, subsequent empirical work has generally backed up her claims. See
n.__ infra.
6 See Alexander (1991) at 571 (“costs [of litigation] do not depend upon proof of wrongdoing
but flow from the simple fact of a sufficiently large decline in share price”). For an example of
a response to Alexander’s line of inquiry, see Seligman (1994) at 444-5, arguing that price
drops alone do not lead to suit and settlement. For more recent empirical work on this
question, see Bohn and Choi (1996), Perino (2003), Choi (2004).
In contrast to the two sides of this argument, my argument is that a sufficiently large
decline in share price is, in fact, “proof of wrongdoing” (to use Alexander’s term), since a
finder of fact can infer incorrect disclosure from the price adjustment.
7 For example, Bohn and Choi have used instrumentalities of material misstatements to test
whether securities actions are meritorious. See Bohn and Choi (1996). Not everyone has
agreed that the strike-suit phenomenon exists. See, e.g., Seligman (1994). Part of the
problem has been that data on settlements are hard to come by, since no opinions are filed
and no judgments entered, and the amounts of settlement are difficult to measure. The new
current wisdom, however, seems to be that some degree of meritless litigation persists even
after litigation reforms such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. See Perino
(2003), Choi (2004).
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support a presumption of inaccuracy. Whatever the merits or demerits of
Section 11, settlements based on share price declines are consistent with a
proper, statistically-informed interpretation of Section 11. I explore this point
in Part II of the paper.
Along the way, I revisit a puzzle that has caused much ink to be spilt
in the finance literature: long term underperformance of initial public
offerings.8 I posit that long term underperformance could, in fact, be an
artifact of regulation, rather than evidence of dysfunctionality in the capital
markets; put quite simply, the imposition of Securities Act liability shifts risk
from shareholders to the entrepreneur, for which the entrepreneur must be
compensated in the form of an artificially high price for the shares. There has
been some, though not much, preliminary work along these lines, upon which
my discussion builds.9 New data makes this issue well worth picking up
again: studies conducted over the last decade suggest that the magnitude of
underperformance is not so great as once thought,10 while the incidence of
securities litigation is significantly higher,11 especially in certain conditions
and for certain firms, than was previously believed. Part III.D puts forth a
simple method for measuring the magnitude of this effect, and finds that the
liability data are consistent with observed underperformance.

“Underperformance” is defined as the long term performance measured from the close of
the first day’s trading. Measuring from the first day’s close is done since the closing price
should represent the fair market value of the issuing firm based upon all publicly available
information. See Brealey and Myers, at ___. This phenomenon was first documented by
Ritter (1991).
9 Alexander discusses a “litigation put” that acts as insurance against market losses, though
she dismisses the possibility of significant effects upon price. See Alexander (1994) at 1447
(considering the “theoretical plausibility” of an embedded put, but concluding that it would
likely be of “negligible value”). Alexander uses the put, instead, to analyze whether securities
damages are measured accurately. See Alexander (1991) at 570 (“to the extent that the ...
termination of the litigation put affects share price, [the current system of measuring
damages] systematically overstates the amount of damages”).
Similarly, Hughes and Thakor (1992) point out that litigation avoidance theories of initial
underpricing can be theoretically consistent with observed long term underperformance, but
then leave the matter at that.
10 See Ritter and Welch (2002).
11 See Perino (2003); Bohn and Choi (1996).
8
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The paper proceeds as follows: in Part II, I provide a description of IPO
liability under the Securities Act of 1933, and explain how application of the
Act’s liability provisions embeds a put option in the firm’s publicly offered
securities. In Part III, I discuss observed trends in IPO price performance,
develop a simple model of how the embedded put affects stock price over
time, and examine existing empirical studies to find that the magnitude of
the embedded option effect may match up with findings of long-term
underperformance among IPO firms. In Part IV, I describe how the
entrepreneur may strategically alter the firm’s capital structure, investment
activity, or other attributes in order to minimize idiosyncratic risk, and also
examine the inefficiencies generated by these strategic maneuvers. Part V
briefly concludes.
II.

Embedding Put-Options through Disclosure Liability
A.

Liability for Inaccurate Disclosure

The standard for liability in a public offering of securities is set by
Section 11 of the 1933 Act, which provides that an issuing firm (along with,
subject to a due diligence defense, the underwriter and the issuer’s directors
and officers) is strictly liable for any material misstatements or omissions in
a registration statement or prospectus.12 The measure of damages if the
plaintiff shows a material misstatement or omission is the initial offering
price of the securities, less the price at the time of suit.13 A misstatement or
omission is deemed “material” if it is something that a reasonable investor
In addition to specifically mandated disclosures, Rule 408 of the Securities Act requires
issuing firms to disclose in a prospectus “such further material information, if any, as may be
necessary to make the required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading.”
13 This is, however, subject to an affirmative defense: if the defendant firm can prove that
some portion of the decline in price resulted from factors other than the firm’s inaccurate
disclosure, the firm can escape liability for that portion of the decline. See Securities Act
Section 11(e). There are alternative forms of damage calculations under Section 11(e) in the
event that the shareholder has sold prior to suit, or enjoys an appreciation in value post-suit,
but these do not affect the analysis.
12
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would have considered important to her investment decision—in short, if it is
something investors should care about, it is material.14 Looking at markets as
a whole, then, any information that affects the price of a security is material,
since a change in price means that investors are changing their investment
decisions.15
Because little, if any, prior information about IPO firms is available,
investors are dependent upon the firm to provide information about itself.16
The Securities Act maintains strict control over the flow of information from
the issuing firm, such that the offering prospectus will contain virtually all of
the publicly available information about the firm. If the Securities Act
successfully prohibits other disclosure of information, then the firm’s price
will be based entirely upon the IPO disclosure.17 Since the price of a security
The concept of “materiality” is defined by Rule 405 of the 1933 Act, which states that “the
term ‘material’ … [refers] to those matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable investor would attach importance in determining to purchase the security….” See
also Vizcarrondo and Houston, Liability, 1385 PLI/Corp 1067 at 1076 (“The leading case on
materiality is TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), which defined a
material fact as one to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
would attach importance in making a decision because the fact would significantly alter the
"total mix" of available information.”)
15 This type of standard has been adopted in other securities litigation contexts as well, such
as 10b-5 claims of fraudulent disclosure that rely on the “fraud on the market” doctrine.”
Price movements in the market price of a security are adequate to prove reliance under Rule
10b-5. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d. 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975).
16 Section 5 of the Securities Act makes it illegal to sell or offer securities prior to the filing of
a registration statement with the SEC. “Offer” is defined broadly under Section 2 of the
Securities Act to include virtually any information released by the issuer or its agents with a
view toward encouraging investors to purchase the issuer’s securities. See SEC Releases
3844 and 5180. Subsequent to filing of the registration statement, written offers may only be
made via the prospectus contained in the registrations statement, and oral offers are subject
to liability under Section 12(a)(2). Thus, the Securities Act effectively channels all
information about an IPO issuer through the Act’s disclosure apparatus. In rare cases,
significant information or “buzz” may exist about a pre-IPO firm. Google is an example of
this, and, indeed, Google appeared to rely largely on its pre-existing reputation to market its
shares to investors, being rather reluctant to disclose additional information in the IPO
itself.
17 Some “leakage” probably does occur, but either the source must be subject to reputational
penalties or to liability of some sort, in order for leaked information to be credible to the
market. Other communications, such as roadshows, are allowed at certain times, but these
communications are also subject to strict liability, under Section 12 of the 1933 Act (subject
to a reasonable care defense). So-called “free-writings” (written materials that accompany a
final Section 10(a) prospectus and are subject to fraud liability) are only available posteffectiveness, subsequent to pricing. There is the possibility that information may leak to the
14
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is determined by a firm’s expected returns, as well as the degree of nondiversifiable risk that accompanies those expected returns,18 the firm’s IPO
prospectus must convey this information to the investor. So we might
conceive of the prospectus as describing a range of outcomes and their
respective probabilities, which translate into a market price.
Suppose an investor is considering a purchase of a security in an IPO,
such as the hypothetical eBank.com, an online bank. In order to arrive at a
valuation for the securities, the investor will need to receive from the firm
information that allows the investor to construct a probabilistic expectation
of the company’s future cash flows. This information, which the Securities
Act requires to be communicated via the prospectus, will be a mixture of all
sorts of information, hard and soft, such as loan loss provisions, capital
budgeting, expectations regarding future deposits, expectations regarding
new lines of business, statements about the company’s competitive position,
and descriptions of managerial competence and reputation. Forward-looking
information, such as earnings forecasts, are particularly important.19
Assuming they believe this information is true, the investor and wider
market will calculate net present value payoffs of the firm (say, for instance,
a per share expected payoff of $45), with some degree of risk (such as an
expected standard deviation in the expected per share payoff of $8), an
element of which is non-diversifiable. Given the levels of risk and the
expected payoff, and taking into account the time value of money, the
investor can arrive at a fair market value for the stock, say, $42.

market via other means that incur a lower level of liability, such as analyst research reports
or underwriter reputation. See James Spindler, Conflict or Credibility: Analyst Conflicts of
Interest and the Market for Underwriting Business, University of Chicago Olin Law and
Economics Working Paper No. 215 (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=564381), for a
model of signaling via analyst research reports.
18 Investors care only about systemic, non-diversifiable risk, also known as beta. Diversifiable
risk (also known as idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk) may be “diversified away” by holding
many different sorts of assets in a portfolio. See Brealey and Myers, Principles of Corporate
Finance, 6th Edition, Chapter 7.
19 See Kim and Ritter, Valuing IPOs, 53 Journal of Financial Economics 409 (1999).
Page 9

Obviously, since our investor is dependent upon the issuing firm for
information about the firm, there needs to be some mechanism—such as a
regime of issuer liability—in place to make issuer-originated information
credible and reliable.20 Section 11 of the Securities Act does just this.21 Any
material inaccuracy results in liability; no fault in terms of inadequate care
or deceptive intent is required for the issuer to be held liable, only inaccuracy
of the prospectus disclosure. This strict accuracy requirement applies
statements of hard fact (“our revenues were $100MM in fiscal 2004”) and to
disclosures regarding risk (“our revenues are dependent upon continued good
relationships with several key clients”), though specific projections and plans,
such as earnings estimates (“we expect our revenues to be higher in fiscal
2005”), are not required to be ex post accurate.22 Liability also attaches for

In a perfectly well-functioning market and in the absence of regulation, we might suppose
that market forces would give rise to non-statutory methods of credibility enhancement, such
as certification by repeat-player auditors and investment banking intermediaries. However,
for whatever reason (such as transaction or search costs, public goods aspects of disclosure,
or simple public choice or inertia), in reality we have a system of mandatory disclosure and
statutory liability. See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure
of Corporate Law at 283.
21 Section 11 is buttressed by Section 12, which covers oral statements in the waiting period
(such as roadshow communications), and the anti-fraud provisions of Section 17 and
Exchange Act Rule 10b-5.
22 Some of these statements may qualify as “forward looking statements” under Rule 175 of
the 1933 Act, and have a slightly more (though how much more is uncertain) protected
status. Rule 175 provides that forward looking statements, such as estimated future
revenues, are not subject to liability except when made or reaffirmed “without a reasonable
basis” or “other than in good faith.” Forward looking statements and projections are not
actionable simply because they are wrong ex post; they must also have been “wrong” ex ante
(i.e., they were unreasonable when made). This protection is limited to rather narrowly
defined “forward-looking statements,” which comprise principally specific plans and
projected economic targets. So, supposing an issuing firm discloses a profit estimate, even
though the firm is not ipso facto liable if it does not meet that estimate, the firm is still
strictly liable for disclosing risks that might lead the firm to fall short of that estimate. See
In Re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation—Taj Mahal Litigation, 7 F.3d. 357 (3rd
Circuit, 1993), where the court applies the so-called “bespeaks caution” doctrine despite the
ostensible applicability of the Rule 175 safe harbor. This is qualified further by the strictures
of the SEC and courts as to what qualifies as “reasonable” and “good faith” disclosure, since
these terms require a high degree of likelihood of, or confidence in, the projection’s coming
true. See, e.g., Regulation S-K, Item 10(b); BNA Corporate Practice Series, Regulatory
Aspects of the Initial Public Offering of Securities, BNACPS No. 60 § VI at n.5 (“Issuers have
generally not taken advantage of the ‘opportunity’ [of Rule 175 disclosure] presented by the
SEC due to concerns that "good faith" might imply a belief on the part of the issuer that the
20
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material omissions, such as failure to disclose risks or flaws in the firm’s
business. The firm is also liable for disclosure, or omissions thereof, regarding
the firm’s exposure to market risk; this makes perfect sense since market
risk, not firm-specific risk, is what the diversified investor should care
about.23
How should a court treat a suit by a shareholder who claims that
eBank’s disclosures pertaining to future performance were inaccurate?
Suppose that the investor went ahead and bought the eBank share for $42. A
year passes, and the actual payoff is revealed to be $29, as opposed to the
expected value of $45. Just on the facts of the situation so far, it is
conceivable that the $29 payoff is consistent with the disclosure in the
prospectus that described an expected value of $45: with a standard deviation
of $8, we would expect a result like this (or worse) to occur about 2.5% of the
time. It is a highly unlikely result, though not impossible. However, a
plaintiff need not show with certainty that the projections were wrong; to the
projections were based on facts that make the achievement of the projections "highly
probable").
In any event, Congress appeared to recognize that even the Rule 175 safe harbor was
inadequate to encourage adequate disclosure, particularly of positive forward looking
information. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) further limits
liability for seasoned (but not IPO) issuers by making forward looking statements subject
only to a fraud standard of liability. See Securities Act §27A(b)(2)(D), (c). The PSLRA was
enacted largely “in order to loosen the ‘muzzling effect’ of potential liability for forwardlooking statements, which often kept investors in the dark about what management foresaw
for the company.” Kevin P. Roddy, Seven Years of Practice and Procedure Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, SJ014 ALI-ABA 395 at 475 (citations omitted).
However, the efficacy of the PSLRA is questionable, too. For both Rule 175 and the PSLRA,
there is always uncertainty as to what constitutes a “forward-looking statement” in the first
place. See, e.g., In re Reliance Secs. Litig., 135 F.Supp.2d 480, at *21 (D. Del. Mar. 29, 2001)
(finding that management’s statement of belief in adequacy of loss reserve was not forward
looking, even though loss reserves relate to expectations of future losses), In re Splash Tech.
Holdings, Inc. Secs. Litig. 2000 WL 1727377, at *6 (finding statements regarding “planned
investments” and market segment health not to be forward looking under the safe harbor).
23 The Securities Act requires issuing firms to make disclosure concerning industry
conditions and trends, as well as sensitivity to market and credit risk. See Items 303 and 305
of Regulation S-K, as well as the general material information requirement of Rule 408. In
practice, firms do provide significant disclosure regarding market risks that have little to do
with their businesses directly (see, e.g., Form F-1 of HDFC Bank, at __, describing risks of
war, including nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan). To the extent that firms
themselves are better able to provide this market-sensitivity information than outsiders, this
would appear a reasonable approach.
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contrary, she need only show it is more likely than not that the projections
were incorrect. And so, here, an actual payoff that is only likely to occur with
a probability of 2.5% if eBank’s projections were accurate, while not the end
of the inquiry, can go some way toward showing that management’s
prospectus disclosure was probably incorrect.
To take a simpler example of such analysis, suppose that an
entrepreneur sells to an investor a security based on five flips of a supposedly
fair coin, which, after five flips, self-destructs. Each time the coin comes up
heads, the investor gets $1 from the entrepreneur, while each time it comes
up tails, the investor gets nothing. If the investor believes that the coin is a
fair coin, the investor should be willing to pay up to $2.50 for this security.
But suppose that the coin comes up tails five times in a row. With no
information available other than this, can the investor make a valid claim
that he has been cheated? Here, the analog of the issuer’s “projection” is the
entrepreneur’s assurance that the coin is “fair,” i.e., that it pays off $1 on
each flip with probability of .5. Then, the actual result (a zero payoff) is one
that should occur only one in thirty-two times with a fair coin.
The investor might allege that the coin was an unfair coin, and sue
under Section 11. Absent the opportunity to inspect the coin directly, the
court would have to look at the degree of prior confidence in the seller’s
projection that the coin was fair. Suppose, for instance, the entrepreneur had
tested the coin only twice before selling it, observing one head and one tail,
and based his price of $2.50 on that. Adding to this sample the five observed
tails post-sale, and assuming no other information is available, the court
could infer a likely outcome of about 14% heads, for an ex ante value of $0.71,
and the entrepreneur would have to pay back $1.79.24
We might wonder if the entrepreneur’s estimate of the value could fall under the Rule 175
safe harbor for forward looking statements. Such a projection may fit the safe harbor’s
narrow definition; however, it is unlikely that a projection based on two observations would
count as “reasonable” or in “good faith.” Additionally, the risk that the coin itself might have
been unfair is not subject to the disclosure safe harbor, and omission of this risk disclosure
would be grounds for Section 11 liability.
24
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However, it is quite likely that prior data of this sort are not available,
especially in the much more complex real world where information is not so
readily quantified, and also because the entrepreneur’s prior knowledge
regarding the firm is not directly verifiable. In the eBank scenario, it seems
quite unlikely that the court would have such data. In that case, one can
estimate an ex ante probability regarding the projections’ accuracy, allowing
us to perform Bayesian analysis to determine the likelihood of accuracy given
the outcome that occurred.25 In calculating a prior confidence of accuracy, if
management is known to be very honest and very competent, for example, we
would assign a higher ex ante probability of accuracy to their projections
than if they were dishonest and incompetent. Other factors could include
looking

at

the

projections’

accuracy

in

predicting

various

discrete

contingencies,26 calling to the stand business and finance experts to opine as
to the reasonableness of such projections at the time made, examining what
projections similarly situated firms made and how their results varied, the
care and research that went into the projections, management’s past history
and reputation, and the accuracy of managerial projections of other firms.27
This prior confidence is then updated by the actual ex post outcome. So, if we
believe that, from an ex ante perspective, eBank’s management was
relatively unlikely to be accurate, and that the poor results obtained were
likely to occur if eBank’s projections were wrong, then we could find it more
likely than not that the projections were, in fact, inaccurate: eBank should be
held liable under Section 11. Furthermore, the poorer the actual result, the
more likely it is that eBank should have to pay. In this fashion, the court can
Bayesian probability states that the probability of A occurring given that B has occurred is
equal to the probability of A and B occurring together divided by the probability of B
occurring. See James Joyce, "Bayes' Theorem", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Winter 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
Hughes and Thakor (1992) develop a similar sort of analysis, where underwriter reputation
serves as the ex ante prior confidence in the correctness of the offering price.
26 If we find that management was wrong about nearly everything, we would be led to
question their general accuracy and predictive ability.
27 This is essentially Rule 175’s requirement that projections and forward looking statements
are not actionable if they have a “reasonable basis.” See n. 23, supra.
25
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incorporate much by way of qualitative evidence in figuring out whether the
firm ought to be found liable.
Another way of looking at the problem is that, given any level of ex
ante belief in the accuracy of the firm’s disclosure, there is range of bad
outcomes (the “bad state of the world”) where the issuing firm should be
found liable under Section 11. This is true for every issuer no matter what
the ex ante confidence in its projections is (short of absolute certainty): a
sufficiently bad outcome still results in a correct ex post determination that
the issuer’s projection was, more likely than not, wrong. As the firm performs
more and more poorly, the likelihood increases that the firm (and the
entrepreneur) will be found liable under Section 11 and made to pay. In a
very real sense, then, eBank and other issuers like it are put into the position
of insuring shareholders against bad outcomes.
B.

Option Characteristics of 1933 Act Liability.

Liability under Section 11 of the 1933 Act bears a striking resemblance
to a “put” option.28 A put option is a derivative security that allows the holder
to sell (or “put”) an underlying security, such as an equity share, to the
counterparty for a set price (also known as the “strike” price). Options usually
have a built-in date of expiration, and their value tends to decline over time
(known as “time decay”) as the date of expiration approaches; the reason for
this is that options are more valuable as uncertainty is greater, and there is,
of course, more uncertainty over a longer period of time than over a shorter
one.
The right of recovery under Section 11 expires with the running of the
statute of limitations in the 1933 Act. The right of action expires one year
from the date of discovery of the misstatement or omission, and in no event
can an action be brought more than three years after the date of the public
See Alexander (1991, 1994) for a prior discussion of put characteristics of securities
liability.
28
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offering.29 Subsequent purchasers of the securities sold in the offering may
bring suit, so long as they can trace their securities back to the public
offering.30
Damages under Section 11 are the difference between the initial
offering price of the security and the price at which the plaintiff brought
suit.31 A successful plaintiff therefore has the functional equivalent of the
right to “put” the shares back to the issuer at the public offering price. For
example, an eBank shareholder, if the share was trading at $29 at the time of
suit, would recover the $13 difference if her suit proves successful. Since the
eBank shares are listed and presumably still liquid, she can sell her shares
and be back exactly where she started, with her $42 investment. In this case,
the $42 initial purchase price would be the strike price of the put.
Finally, under Section 11, shareholders can sue any time the price of
the securities declines below the initial offering price. As described above,
whether the suit is successful depends on whether the firm’s performance has
been poor enough to make it appear more likely than not that management’s
disclosures were materially inaccurate. This means that there is a range of
price that is below the public offering price but where the shareholder will
not be able to exercise the put.32 The level of this threshold will depend upon
ex ante estimations of prior accuracy, and we might expect that both
See §13 of the 1933 Act. One should note that the statute of limitations for fraud has been
increased under §804 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act to two years after the discovery of the fraud,
and not more than five years after the commission.
30 This may not always be easy to do, at least for individual subsequent purchases made
through a broker. See Hillary Sale, Disappearing Without a Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2)
of the 1933 Securities Act, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 429. While the simplified model of this paper
only contemplates one primary offering (making tracing irrelevant), in real life the tracing
requirement could mean that shares lose value as they trade hands, creating illiquidity, and
that shares are worth more in the hands of some investors, such as large institutional
investors who have the economy of scale to ensure that tracing requirements are met, than
others.
31 The defendant can show that the plaintiff’s damages (i.e., the difference between the offer
price and the price at the time of suit) were caused by other than the misstatement—but this
is really getting to an issue of materiality as discussed above.
32 Because of this, the option payoff would appear kinked, with a payoff of zero between the
offering price and the price point at which a court would find liability.
29
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investors and issuers anticipate, with at least a rough degree of precision,
that a certain low level of firm and security price performance would allow a
successful Section 11 suit. So, at the time the equity cum put option is offered
for sale, purchaser and seller alike are aware that the embedded put option
will be exercisable in the bad state of the world, and so both the purchaser
and seller can arrive at a valuation for the option. The total price paid for an
IPO share will be the fair market value of the equity security, plus the fair
market value of the embedded put option; the trading price of the firm’s
securities will imply a valuation that is in excess of the total value of the
firm.
How will the price of the option vary? First, we know that options
decline in value as they approach their expiration date. This is due to the
decline in uncertainty that the option is insuring against: as the expiration
date approaches, the insurance policy covers a smaller span of time, which
means that it is worth less. After their expiration date, options are worth
nothing: they have either been exercised, or they are expired. So, even
assuming the underlying value of the equity stays constant (i.e., market
expectations regarding the firm do not change or the firm performs exactly to
expectations), we should see a declining share price over time (relative to
what it would have been without the put option) dating from the end of
trading on the day of the IPO to the running of the statute of limitations.
Even IPO firms that perform up to expectations (and even, to some extent,
beyond expectations) should experience price underperformance relative to
identical non-IPO firms.
Second, the value of the put option will depend upon the financial
condition and structure of the firm. For an insolvent firm that cannot possibly
make good on the shareholders’ put option, the option will be worth nothing,
and it will be as though Section 11 liability does not exist. Shareholders will
bear the risk of poor future performance, but, at the same time, they will not
have paid for insurance against that risk (assuming ex post insolvency was
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foreseen ex ante). For a solvent firm, the put option will be worth its full
potential value. Similarly, depending on how the firm’s sponsor or founder
sets up the capital structure, the put option will vary in value. If assets are
withdrawn from the firm, for example, the value of the put option declines, in
addition to any decline in the value of the equity. We might expect, then, that
depending upon what type of risk-sharing is most efficient, or, more
particularly, what type of risk-sharing maximizes the entrepreneur’s or
sponsor’s self-interest, we would see a range of different capital structures
cropping up. These possibilities are discussed in detail in Parts III and IV
below.
III.

Underperformance, Embedded Puts, and the IPO Decision
This section analyzes how, exactly, the imposition of the Section 11

embedded put right affects the entrepreneur’s incentives. In Part III.A, I
present a simple model of the entrepreneur’s decision to take his firm public
through the IPO process, and then, in Part III.B, I show how the addition of
an embedded put right destroys value and affects his decisionmaking. I then
show, in Part III.C, how uncertainty regarding whether the put right will be
exercisable can lead to initial underpricing at the time of the IPO, and still
result in long term underperformance. The model I describe presents a
simple method of estimating the value of the put option and the amount of
value that it can potentially destroy based on known parameters, which I do
in Part III.D; I also consider whether the observed magnitude and timing of
long term underperformance is consistent with the model.
A. The Decision of How to Fund a Project
Suppose we have an entrepreneur who has a project that has a positive
expected value (i.e., the project is expected, on average, to make money). The
project, in the good state of the world, will perform very well and will make a
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lot of money (denoted as G), or, in the bad state of the world, the project
performs poorly, and will make little or no money (B < G). The project costs C
to undertake, which the entrepreneur can fund with his own wealth or by
recourse borrowing from a bank.33 Since in either case the entrepreneur must
bear the cost of the project no matter what the outcome, the two possible
payoffs are (G – C), which occurs with probability g, and (B – C), which occurs
with probability (1 – g). The total expected value of the project is
then gG+ (1 − g )B − C . To take a simple numerical example, if the probabilities
of both the good and the bad states of the world are 50%, the good state cash
flow from the project is 18, the bad state cash flow is $2, and the cost of the
project is $2, then the expected value of the project is .5($18) + .5($2) – $2 =
$8.
If the entrepreneur is risk averse, his utility from holding on to the
project will be less than his utility from receiving the expected value of the
project up front, since the project’s payoffs are uncertain.34 For example,
suppose the entrepreneur’s utility function is given as the square root of his
wealth.35 Then the expected utility from the project is .5 18 − 2 + .5 2 − 2 = 2 .
This is less than the utility of 2.83 that the entrepreneur would enjoy from
receiving the expected value of the project up front.36
Rather than wait to see how the project turns out, the entrepreneur
may desire to sell part or all of the project to a shareholder. Why would the
entrepreneur wish to do this? The principal reason is that the project is more
valuable in the hands of the shareholder, who can diversify her assets by
At this point in the analysis, I am assuming that the entrepreneur will be solvent even in
the bad state of the world. If insolvency is a risk, then the cost of borrowing is higher.
34 The entrepreneur is likely to be risk averse with respect to the firm’s idiosyncratic risk
because of wealth constraints—i.e., the amount of his wealth that is tied up in the firm is
probably great enough that he is unable to diversify away the firm-specific risk. See Ritter
and Welch (2002) at 1798 (“Pre-IPO ‘angel’ investors or venture capitalists hold undiversified
portfolios, and, therefore, are not willing to pay as high a price as diversified public-market
investors”). See Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999); Amit, Glosten, and Miller (1990). Hughes
(1986), at 121, makes a similar assumption regarding risk aversion.
35 The entrepreneur’s expected utility would be written as
g G − C + (1 − g ) B − C .
33

36

This is because the entrepreneur gets $8 in either state of the world, and .5 8 + .5 8 = 2.83 .
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holding shares of many such projects, than in the hands of the entrepreneur,
who cannot.37 So, in this example, the entrepreneur would sell the
shareholder a share or shares of stock representing some portion of the equity
of the firm, in return for the cost of the project C.38 How would the
shareholder price the equity—that is, the right to receive the cash flows from
this project? The shareholder (who is risk neutral with regard to idiosyncratic
risk)39 would be willing to pay up to the point where her expected return from
the venture equals her investment. More formally, the shareholder will be
willing to contribute the project funding cost C when the expected value of
the share of the firm k that she receives is great enough that
k [gG + (1 − g )B ] − C ≥ 0 In the above numerical example, the shareholder, in

return for contributing the cost C = $2 to the firm, would receive one-fifth of
the firm (k = .2), while the entrepreneur would retain the other four-fifths.40

Some scholars have pointed to the desire for risk-diversification as being the primary
impetus for the creation of the corporate form. [cite]
38 Why wouldn’t the entrepreneur sell the entire project? One reason is that since the
entrepreneur will have to pay the shareholders a market rate of return on their equity
investment, it is likely that the entrepreneur would be unable to raise more than C dollars
since the entrepreneur would have no useful employment for the excess cash. For example,
suppose there are five identical but uncorrelated projects belonging to entrepreneurs E1
through E5, where each project costs $2 to run and has a positive NPV; assuming that we
have a shareholder with exactly $10—just enough to fund each of the projects—the
shareholder would maximize the value of her capital by funding each of the projects and
receiving some positive rent from each of the entrepreneurs.
An additional consideration is that shareholders may desire that the entrepreneur retain a
significant stake in the firm as a way to mitigate agency costs, especially if the
entrepreneur’s skills are required to make the project work correctly. This is more likely to
be the case in firms that rely heavily upon the skills and experience of their founders, or
firms that rely heavily on human capital and require large stock grants to insiders to
incentive and retain them. I discuss the problem of “cashing out” in Part IV.D.
In fact, the data suggests that the entrepreneur generally will retain a sizeable stake: of IPO
firms who are subsequently sued, firm insiders (directors and officers of the firm) own 49.2%
of the firm after the offering. See Bohn and Choi (1996) at 961.
39 I am assuming that systemic risk (or beta) is already priced in to these examples. Since
beta risk should be borne equally well by either the entrepreneur or the shareholder, the
explicit addition of systemic risk would not change the analysis. Note, however, that having
the entrepreneur bear systemic risk may be harmful: some of the hedging strategies
discussed in Part IV (such as managerial entrenchment) would be useful for hedging
systemic risk as well.
40 With the shareholder’s capital contribution of $2, the expected value of the firm is now $10,
which is the expected value $8 of the project plus the $2 capital contribution. So the share of
37
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The expected absolute payoff to the entrepreneur in this situation is the same
as before (the entrepreneur sells the share for its net present value), but the
entrepreneur’s utility in this situation is higher since the level of risk that
the entrepreneur is exposed to is lower. Numerically, the entrepreneur’s
objective payoff is g(1 – k)G + (1 – g)(1 – k)B = .5*.8*18 + .5*.8*2 = $8, which
is the same as before. However, with the same risk averse utility function as
above, we can see that the entrepreneur’s utility is higher, since
.5 .8 × 18 + .5 .8 × 2 = 2.53 , as opposed to utility of 2 that the entrepreneur
would receive from funding the project himself or taking out recourse
borrowing.
From the above analysis, we can see that total welfare is maximized
when the risk-averse entrepreneur can sell part of his project to the riskneutral shareholder. As a bearer of risk, the entrepreneur is quite inefficient,
while the shareholder is very efficient. The entrepreneur can offload part or
all of the idiosyncratic risk onto the shareholder, who can simply diversify it
away with very little cost.
B.

The Addition of an Embedded Put Right

Now, suppose the law mandates that when the entrepreneur sells the
shareholder the stock, the shareholder also gets the right to sell the stock
back to the entrepreneur for the purchase price in the bad state of the world
(a money-back guarantee or a put right). Such would be the case under
Section 11 of the 1933 Act, where, in the bad state of the world, the
shareholder may successfully sue for damages equal to the offering price of
the security less the subsequent trading value. Suppose for the moment that
the put right is certain to be exercisable in the bad state of the world. What
are the payoffs to the entrepreneur and the shareholder in such a case?
the stock that the shareholder owns, should she trade it on the market, would be worth $2,
since k*$10 = .2 * $10 = $2.
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In the good state of the world, the shareholder will receive her share of
the good-state cash flows (kG), while in the bad state of the world, the
shareholder will sue the entrepreneur to recover the amount of her
investment. In our numerical example, in the good state of the world the
shareholder would receive a net payoff of (k*$18) – $2, while in the bad state
the shareholder would receive a net payoff of $2 – $2 = $0, and so the
minimum fraction of the project that the shareholder would demand in
return for her investment of $2 is a one-ninth share of the firm.41 The
entrepreneur’s payoff in this case is .5(8/9)18 + .5(0) = $8, and his expected
utility is 2, which is identical to in the prior case where the entrepreneur
funds the firm himself or through recourse borrowing.
Note that the addition of this mandatory put option makes the risk
averse entrepreneur worse off, but does not benefit the shareholder. The
entrepreneur is unable to get rid of his risk: his payoffs and expected utility
under the mandatory put regime are the same as if he had not sold the
project to the shareholder in the first place. The important point here is that
the mandatory put is, from the entrepreneur’s and shareholder’s point of
view, functionally equivalent to a legal rule prohibiting the entrepreneur
from selling the project to the shareholder.
The shareholder is indifferent between the two scenarios. In the first
case, without the put right, the shareholder pays $2 for an expected return of
$2. In the second case, with the put right, the shareholder again pays $2 and
again receives an expected return of $2. The variance (which is entirely
idiosyncratic risk) in the first case is higher, but since the shareholder can
hold a broad spectrum of assets in her portfolio, this firm-specific risk can be
diversified away and is not relevant.
The apparent market valuation of the firm in the second case is higher:
the shareholder in the first case receives one-fifth of the firm for her
In the good state, then, the shareholder receives 1/9 * $18 – $2 = $0, and in the bad state,
$2 - $2 = 0.
41
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investment of $2, implying a total firm value of $10, while in the second case,
the shareholder receives only one-ninth of the firm for the same investment,
implying a total firm value of $18. The disparity between the two valuations,
however, is not because the firm’s intrinsic expected value changes, since that
stays at $10 in each case. Rather, the put option has a value that is reflected
in the price the shareholder pays for her shares. For her investment of $2 in
the firm with the put option, the shareholder receives a one-ninth equity
share worth $1.11 (since the expected value of the firm’s cash flows is $10, of
which she owns a ninth), while the embedded put option accounts for the
other $.89 of value.
Since the option is not alienable from the equity interest, the
value of the option will continue to affect the price at which the shares trade.
At time zero, when the entrepreneur sells the shares to the shareholder, the
shares will trade as if the expected value of the firm were $18, even though
the expected value of the firm is only $10. At time 1, the good or bad state of
the world is revealed, and at time 2 the shareholder will exercise her put
option if it is in the money. There are two possible outcomes: (a) in the good
state, the firm would realize cash flows of $18 and the shares would continue
to trade reflecting the now-underlying value of $18, or (b) the bad state of the
world is revealed, the shareholder exercises her put, withdrawing the
remaining value of $2 from the firm, and the underlying equity interest is
now worth zero. In the figure below, outcome (a) is denoted by the blue line,
and outcome (b) is denoted by the red line. At time 0, the shares are sold to
the shareholder; at time 1, the good or bad state of the world is revealed; and
at time 2 the shareholder can exercise her put option. The green line, labeled
“aggregate payoff” shows what a market index of identical (but uncorrelated)
firms would look like: all firms would start out priced at $18, but at time 2,
when shareholders of firms suffering a bad state exercise their put options,
half the firms in the index have a value that drops to zero, while half the
firms remain priced at $18, for an aggregate price of $9. For contrast, the

Page 22

black dotted line shows what an index of such identical firms would look like
if no embedded put option existed, meaning that firms are priced only based
on expected future cash flows.
Individual good
payoff

18
Share
Price
(C/k)

Expected value of firm’s cash flows
(aggregate payoff w/o embedded
option)

10
9

Aggregate payoff

2
Individual bad
payoff

0
t=0

t=1

t=2

Time

Two features of this graph are notable. First, with an embedded put
option, the firm is initially priced in excess of expected value. This is due to
the value of the put option, which is extinguished at time 2. Second, over
time, aggregate price of such firms declines to a point below the ex ante
expected value of the firm’s cash flows. This is because money is coming out
of the firm. Putting the two effects together, IPO firms would appear to
underperform non-IPO firms.
C.

Price Movements with an Endogenous Put: Initial Underpricing,
Long-Term Underperformance

We might expect that the 1933 Act only imposes liability on the part of
the issuing firm some percentage of the time, which we can denote as
probability θ, where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 . A θ of 1 means the put always will be enforced,
and a θ of zero means the put will never be enforced; a value between 1 and
zero means that there is only a likelihood of enforcement. As θ approaches
zero, the expected value of the put also declines to zero, and the price a
shareholder is willing to pay for the security declines to the expected value of
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the firms’ project, which in the numerical example above would be $10.42 A
lower θ makes the entrepreneur better off, though risk-averse shareholders
are indifferent.43
An exogenously determined θ has no effect on the entrepreneur’s
pricing decision: as where θ equals zero or one, the entrepreneur will simply
charge the highest price that shareholders will pay for the shares.44 The more
interesting case, however, is where θ varies with the price. Suppose that θ is
a positive function of the initial offering price. That is, as the price at which
the entrepreneur sells the securities increases, so does the probability of
being found liable (θ) if the bad state of the world occurs. In such a situation,
there may be times when the entrepreneur chooses to offer the securities at a
lower price than the market would bear—meaning that the market would
immediately bid up the price of the shares once trading begins.
Why would the probability of being found liable increase as the offering
price increases? There are several possible reasons. First, significant
underpricing may be a payoff to initial allocatees not to sue. Initial allocatees
are largely institutional investors, who are repeat players in the IPO game,
and who can be shut out of future offerings by the underwriter if they do not
“play along.” Alternatively, and even more effectively, we might suppose that
the initial allocatees remit a portion of the underpricing back to the issuing
firm which lowers the offering price without reducing the proceeds to the
issuer; this may take the form of tie-ins or other future business, or else be
This is after the shareholder’s $2 capital contribution to fund the project.
Assuming that the firm will be solvent to pay the put (i.e., B ≥ C), the shareholder’s payoff
function is gkG + (1 − g )[θC + (1 − θ )kB] − C . In the bad state of the world, with probability θ, she
can exercise the put and receive back her purchase price C, while with probability (1- θ) she
will only receive her share of the bad state profits, kB. The entrepreneur’s absolute payoff
function is given as g (1 − k )G + (1 − g )[θ (B - C ) + (1 − θ )(1 − k )B ] . The entrepreneur’s utility function
(following the example given above) is the probability-weighted square roots of the ultimate
state payoffs, or g (1 − k )G + (1 − g )θ B − C + (1 − g )(1 − θ ) (1 − k )B . Insolvency makes the put less

42
43

valuable; at the extreme, with complete insolvency (i.e., B = 0), the put has zero value.
The reason for this is that lowering the price charged only serves to reduce the
entrepreneur’s payoff in the good state of the world, without raising the entrepreneur’s
payoff in the bad state.
44
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intermediated through the underwriter, who is a repeat player, in the form of
lowered underwriting fees or enhanced services.45 Second, as proposed in
Hughes and Thakor (1992), underwriters who develop reputations for
consistently underpricing have a higher Bayesian prior of having priced
correctly.46 Other litigation-related models of underpricing have also been put
forward;47 a complete exposition and analysis of these is, however, beyond the
scope of this paper.
Returning to our numerical example, suppose θ equals 1 whenever the
entrepreneur offers the share at any price representing a firm value above
$9, and is equal to 0.1 whenever the entrepreneur sells at a price less than or
equal to $9.48 In this situation, the entrepreneur would choose to sell at $9 (P
= C/k = $2/(2/9) = $9), since this yields an expected utility of 2.43, as opposed
to expected of utility of 2 if he were to sell at the maximum price the market

The bribe method of avoiding liability is subject to some leakage, since initial allocatees
generally do not hold on to all their allocations, and subsequent purchasers may also sue,
and can utilize the class action mechanism. Institutions, however, do generally end up
holding a large amount of the allocations, and have traditionally gotten a disproportionately
large share of the awards or settlement from such litigation. The PSLRA, which strengthens
the position of institutional investors by making them more likely to be the representative or
lead plaintiff, could, under these theories of litigation avoidance, in fact increase the degree
of initial underpricing, since placing underpriced securities with institutions as a bribe not to
sue would become more cost-effective. This is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
Having the initial allocatees simply hand back the amount of the underpricing to the issuer
would, on the other hand, not be subject to such leakage, since this lowers the maximum
potential damages without reducing proceeds to the issuer.
46 Some scholarship suggests that underwriter reputation is not particularly useful for
ensuring a fair price, and this theory of underpricing also largely neglects the role that the
issuing firm’s disclosure plays in determining price. Bohn and Choi (1996) find that
underwriter reputation, as proxied by lead and co-lead positions, has an inverse correlation
with subsequent liability—exactly the opposite relationship suggested by Hughes and
Thakor’s undewriter-driven model. Also, the same measurement problems that make it
difficult to measure long run relative performance (as described in Ritter and Welch (2003))
also make it difficult to discern an underwriter’s reputation for fair pricing. See Spindler
(2005), making a similar point.
47 See, e.g., Tinic (1988), Hensler (1995). But c.f. Drake and Vetsuypens (1993) and Alexander
(1996), arguing against litigation avoidance theories of underpricing.
48 This function, though discontinuous, could represent the “going rate” payoff to institutional
investors not to sue. The point to be made here is simply that at least some liability functions
will result in rational initial underpricing and long term underperformance.
45
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would bear, which is k = 1/9 or $18.49 So the initial price of the offering is 9,
but the trading price would immediately rise to $10.35, since at this price the
expected return to the shareholder from the share would equal the cost.50
(One could conceptualize the initial underpricing of $1.35 as being the goingrate for a bribe of initial allocatees not to sue.) This would look like a first day
price spike, a common occurrence in IPOs.51 The spike is the difference
between the offering price, set to avoid liability, and the expected value of the
firm’s cash flows ($10) plus the value of the embedded option component
($0.35).52
Later on, if the good state of the world occurs, the price of the share
would rise to 18. If the bad state of the world occurs, the shareholder can
exercise her put option with probability θ = .1. If she is able to enforce her
put, the price of the underlying equity declines to zero (she takes the
remaining money out of the firm, and the equity becomes worthless), and if
49 Why would the entrepreneur, if he is going to sell above $9, sell at $18? The reason is that
because θ does not increase as the entrepreneur raises the offering price of the firm above
$9.01, his expected bad state payoff does not worsen, either. Realizing this, the entrepreneur
would then seek to maximize his good state payoff by raising the firm price as high as
possible, with the limit being set by what shareholders are willing to pay. Since the
shareholder’s payoff function is gkG + (1 − g )[θC + (1 − θ )kB] − C , plugging in the numbers, we
find that k = 1/9. Since the offering price of the firm, P, is equal to C/k, the offering price of
the firm here will be $18. The entrepreneur’s utility pursuing this strategy is
g (1 − k )G + (1 − g )θ B − C + (1 − g )(1 − θ ) (1 − k )B , or .5 (1 − 1 9 )$18 + (.5 ) $2 − $2 = 2 .
Similarly, we can figure what price the entrepreneur would sell for, given that he is going to
sell for not more than $9. Because θ is constant between $0 and $9, increasing the price all
the way to $9 increases the entrepreneur’s upside without worsening the downside; so we can
conclude he will sell at $9, which means that k = 2/9. At a price of $9, shareholders would pay
$2 to receive 2/9 of the firm. The entrepreneur’s utility here will be
.5 (1 − 2 / 9 )$18 + (.5)(.1) $2 − $2 + .5(.9 ) (1 − 2 / 9 )2 , or 2.43.

The
shareholder
payoff
from
holding
the
share
of
the
firm
is
(.5)(2 / 9)($18) + (.5)[(.1)($2) + (.9)(2 / 9)($2)] , or $2.3, meaning that the market would bid the price
up to $10.35 ($2.3 / (2/9) = $10.35).
51 Ritter and Welch (2002) at 1802 estimate that IPOs are underpriced about 18.8% on
average.
52 It is not necessarily always going to be the case the IPO is underpriced relative to the
value of the firm’s cash flows. For example, if the function θ is 1 whenever pricing is above
$11, but .1 whenever pricing is below $11, the entrepreneur would price the shares at $11,
which is above the expected value of the firm’s cash flows. There would still be a spike in the
price, however, since the value of the option has not been completely priced in. So we would
still see the same patterns of apparent short-term underpricing and long term overpricing.
50
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not, the price of the security declines to 2. In the aggregate, the price of an
index of identical firms would come to rest at 9.9, which is below the ex ante
expected value of the firm. The following graph illustrates these price
movements.
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18
10.35
10
Aggregate price pattern

9.9
9
Bad state occurs

2.7

Court does not
enforce put

2

Court enforces put

0
t=0

t=1

t=2

Note that the aggregate price pattern line of this graph resembles the
observed

phenomena

of

short

term

underpricing

and

long

term

underperformance. What this analysis shows is that initial underpricing is
compatible with long-term overpricing, and that both phenomena may occur
as a result of Securities Act liability. “Underperformance”—meaning an
initial trading price that is in excess of the expected value of the firm’s future
cash flows—is here a result not of deceptive practices on the part of the
issuing firm or underwriter, but rather a consequence of a built-in statutory
liability that refunds a shareholder’s investment in the bad state of the
world.
Is initial underpricing necessarily a bad thing? After all, while issuing
firms do not receive as high a price for their shares, initial purchasers of
securities gain. However, the result of systemic underpricing is to make it
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more expensive for firms to raise equity, and particularly among those firms
that have a higher degree of risk.
D.

Can This Theory of Embedded Options Explain Observed
Patterns of Long-Term Underperformance?53

In this section, I present a way to value the expected magnitude of
“IPO underperformance” due to liability effects, utilizing existing data on the
rate of suit and settlement. IPO underperformance is the phenomenon
whereby IPO stocks appear to underperform the market in the long-run (say,
five years), measured from the close of the first day of trading.54 This appears
to make them a systematically bad deal for those investors who are not lucky
enough to get in on the initial allocations of the IPO shares.55 Indeed, this
trend has led some commentators to question whether the capital markets
really are efficient, or whether some form of fraud, bounded rationality, or
fundamental shortcoming of the IPO process is at play.56 I would posit, in
contrast, that regulatory distortion can explain at least some of this
underperformance: the 1933 Act’s embedded put option causes securities to
be sold in excess of the value of their discounted cash flows, and in the bad

I would stress that, even if the magnitude of the liability put is not particularly large
relative to the share price, this does not affect the results in the other portions of the paper.
Even if the entrepreneur’s stake in the firm is small relative to total firm value, his stake is
probably still significant to him and will affect his behavior as described in Part IV.
54 See Brealey and Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, at 419 (“There is… at least one
puzzle left. [I]t appears that the long-run performance of companies that issue shares is
substandard. Investors who bought these companies’ shares after the stock issue earned
lower returns than they would have if they had bought into similar companies…. If so, we
have an exception to the efficient-market theory.”); Ritter and Welch (2002) at 1816-22. The
underpricing trend was first noted by Ritter (1991). Ritter and Welch (2002) provide an
excellent overview of theories and research on long term IPO underperformance as well as
short term underpricing.
55 The initial allocations are, on average, underpriced by about 18.8%, compared to the first
day’s close, meaning that the issuer theoretically could have received a significantly greater
amount of proceeds than it did. See Ritter and Welch at 1802 (examining a sample of IPOs
from 1980 to 2001). This, of course, is a good deal for investors, but initial allocations are
doled out principally to institutional investors and favored clients. The overall pattern of IPO
pricing is an immediate first day spike, followed by a multi-year period of underperformance
relative to the non-IPO market (i.e., firms whose IPO was more than five years prior).
56 See Soderquist and Shayne (1995); Ritter and Welch (2002).
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state of the world, the value of the securities is depressed as the option
component’s value is extinguished and money comes out of the firm to pay off
the put right.57
Why would IPO firms fare differently under the Securities Act than
non-IPO firms (i.e., firms who are more than five years out from their IPO)?
Most obviously, IPO firms have, by definition, just done a public offering,
making them subject to Securities Act liability; non-IPO firms may not have.
Non-IPO firms, even if they have recently done an offering, will also have
shares outstanding that are not subject to Section 11 liability. Additionally,
non-IPO firms have numerous disclosure options that are subject only to
fraud liability, such as annual reports, press releases, and conference calls,58
whereas all of the IPO issuer’s disclosure is subject to strict liability, with
IPO disclosure requirements being generally much more extensive than that
required of non-IPO firms. With this in mind, we can make a few specific
predictions about how IPO firms will appear to perform compared to non-IPO
firms.
1.

Timing

First off, we can make some predictions from the model about when
the bulk of the underperformance ought to occur. While price decay of the
option component should continue over time, we would expect price decay to
accelerate as expiration nears. The expiration of the option may be at one of
two general times: one year from the date of discovery of the misstatement or
omission, or three years after the date of the offering, as a final outer limit.
The first potential expiration date can be no earlier than one year after the
offering, but thereafter the plaintiff runs some risk of being barred; so, when
a firm has performed poorly, we would expect a cluster of suits just before one
Alexander (1991, 1994) and Hughes and Thakor (1992) make a similar point.
Non-IPO issuers also have the benefit of the PSLRA safe harbor for forward looking
statements, which employs a fraud standard, as opposed to Rule 175’s “reasonable” and “good
faith”—often interpreted to mean “likelihood” (see n.23 supra)—requirement.
57
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year after the date of the offering, since plaintiffs want to make sure that
their claims are not barred by the statute. From this, we would expect to see
the greatest amount of underperformance just before the one and three year
marks.
Data from Ritter (2003)59 appear to comport with these timing
predictions: in a sample of 7,850 IPO firms and non-IPO firms taken from
1970 to 2002, Ritter finds that IPO firms tend to underperform in the first
year post-issuance (for size matched firms, underperformance was 3.6%,
whereas for size and book-to-market ratio matched firms, underperformance
was 0.5%), with poorer returns concentrated in the second half of the year
(for size matched, IPO firms actually outperformed in the first six months by
1.7%, but then underperformed in the second six months by 5.3%; for size and
book-to-market matched firms, IPO firms outperformed by 4.3% in the first
six months, only to underperform by 4.2% in the second six months). This
pattern of greater underperformance in the second half of the first year exists
when looking at individual decades of the 70s, 80s and 90s, as well. Even in
the 80s, when IPO firms appear not to have experienced significant
underperformance,60 IPO firms still exhibit the pattern of doing relatively
worse in the second half of the first year.61
There is, similarly, an greater degree of underperformance in the
second and third years as compared to the fourth and fifth years. IPO
underperformance (against size-matched firms) accelerates from 3.6% in year
one to 8.8% in year two and 5.1% in year 3, before tapering off in years four

See Jay Ritter, Long-run returns on IPOs from 1970 to 2002, available at
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOS5.PDF
60 Against size-matched firms, IPO firms underperformed by 2.8% in the 80s, while against
size and book-to-market matched firms, IPO firms actually outperformed by 0.4%.
61 Against size matched firms, IPO’s outperformed by 1% in the first six months, and
underperformed by 2.8% in the second six months. Against size and book-to-market matched
firms, IPO firms outperformed by 4.9% in the first six months, but then underperformed by
0.5% in the second six months.
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and five (where underperformance is 2.6% and 0.8%, respectively).62 This is,
again, consistent with the statute of limitations: three years after the date of
an offering is the cut-off for any action under Section 11, after which claims
cannot

be

filed.

Roughly

speaking,

at

least,

the

timing

of

IPO

underperformance appears consistent with an embedded put model, where
option expirations are concentrated at one and three years after the
offering.63
2.

Magnitude

While some previous work has suggested that the incidence of
securities suits may not be great enough to contribute significantly to IPO
underperformance,64 more recent and more detailed evidence on rates of suit
and magnitude of settlement suggests just the opposite. For example,
according to a study by James Bohn and Stephen Choi, for the top decile of
firms by offering size, the incidence of lawsuit is 12.20%.65 The top 20% of
issuers account for just under half of all IPO suits in Bohn and Choi’s sample
(with a suit incidence of 9.1%), and, since the top 20% by size of IPO issuers
account for at least (and almost certainly more) than 47% of IPO volume,
dollar-weighted figures for incidence of IPO suit would likely be higher.66
For size and book-to-market matched firms, IPO underperformance is 0.5% in year one,
4.1% in year two, 3.1% in year three, 3.4% in year four, and 1.1% in year five.
63 The timing of underperformance also appears to accord roughly with the length of time
after the IPO that plaintiffs file suit, as reported by Bohn and Choi (1996) at 929 (of 103 IPO
suits, 11 were filed in the first six months after the offering, 28 were filed between six
months and one year after the offering, 35 were filed in the second year, 30 were filed in the
third year, and nine were filed more than three years after the IPO). This, again, looks like
the sort of clustering we would expect to see with options having an uncertain one or three
year expiration.
64 The only previous attempt to estimate the magnitude of this effect is that of Alexander
(1994), See Alexander at 1447. Alexander relied on unpublished data and the Drake and
Vetsuypens study, infra, that looked at the average rate of suit incidence during only a small
time period. More recent data, discussed infra, suggests that rates of suit overall may be
higher, and that rates of suit are significantly higher for larger or higher-variance issuers.
65 James Bohn and Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New Issues Market, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev 905,
936. This is in contrast to the overall incidence of suit of 3.5% for all IPO firms.
66 From Bohn and Choi’s Table 2.5, by adding up the minimum bounds of the various firmsize categories, one can surmise that the top 20% of offerings by size accounted for, at the
62
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While these are fairly rough numbers, they suggest that the median IPO
dollar gets sued at least 9.1% of the time, which may well have significant
effects on securities price movements.
Assuming a suit occurs, how much money can shareholders expect to
get back? Drake and Vetsuypens, in a study of 93 IPOs dating from 1969 to
1990, report that a firm whose shares decline below their offering price,
conditional upon being sued, can expect to settle for 31.7% of the post offering
decline, on average.67 After accounting for attorneys’ fees (which takes up
approximately 21% of settlement amounts), shareholders receive about 25%
of post offering declines.68 Taking that, along with Bohn and Choi’s number
for incidence of suit for the largest 20% of offerings—9.1%—as a proxy for the
likelihood of the bad state of the world occurring; and assuming a minimallysolvent issuing firm in the bad state of the world,69 we would find that, in the
aggregate, IPO securities would underperform otherwise identical IPO
securities by about 2.3%.70 This is not so far off from the 5.1%
underperformance that Ritter and Welch find for IPO firms in a style and
size-matched sample.71
Of course, had I used a smaller suit incidence rate, such as Bohn and
Choi’s overall average of 3.5%, the degree of underperformance would have
very least (and probably significantly more), 47% of total offering volume. See Bohn and Choi
(1996) at 936.
67 See Drake and Vetsuypens (1993)
68 See O’Brien (1991)
69 That is, C = B.
70 With an average settlement/losses ratio of S, the specification here is that the shareholder
will invest where gkG + (1 − g )[SC + (1 − S )kB] − C ≥ 0. In the bad state of the world, the
shareholder has probability S of recovering her investment C, while with probability 1-S she
will receive only her share of the firm, kB. Solving for k, we find that the shareholder would
demand, in return for her investment of C, a share of the firm k at least as great as
C − (1 − g ) SC
.
k=
gG + (1 − g )(1 − S ) B

The imputed price of the firm at the time of the IPO is equal to C/k, while the expected value
of the firm after the good or bad state of the world is revealed and after the put may be
determined exercisable is gG + (1 − g )(S ( B − C ) + (1 − S ) B ) . Relative underperformance, as a
percentage, compared to identical non-IPO firms is C k − gG − (1 − g )(S ( B − C ) + (1 − S ) B ) .
C
71

See Ritter and Welch (2002), at 1817.
Page 32

k

been smaller—only about 0.9%—but this is still a notable effect. On the other
hand, utilizing a higher incidence of suit, such as the 12.2% that the largest
decile of offerings face, the degree of underperformance grows larger, to 3.1%.
Going still higher, by taking O’Brien and Hodge’s finding that 1 in 4
computer and electronics manufacturers is sued, we would expect relative
underperformance of 6.3%. As the probability of a bad state of the world gets
higher, as proxied by the incidence of suit, so does the degree of
underperformance.
Where the firm is more than minimally-solvent (B > C) in the bad
state, underperformance is positively correlated to the spread between the
payoffs in the good and bad states of the world. For instance, if a firm had
good and bad payoffs of 6 and 3, with C = 2,the degree of underperformance of
a firm that has a 9.1% chance of reaching the bad state is 1.9%. Raising the
good state payoff to 12 increases underperformance to 2.1%. Generalizing
from this, firms with the highest degree of good/bad spread and the greatest
probability of suffering a bad state payoff would tend to exhibit the most
underperformance. This might be a good characterization of the sort of very
speculative, boom-or-bust high-tech companies that dominated the IPO
market in the late 1990s, and so we would expect to see the greatest degree of
underperformance there. While data in this area are currently lacking, there
is some rough empirical sugpport for this proposition: in going-public cohorts
that have a high percentage of technology stocks, underperformance tends to
be higher. For instance, in 1980 to 1989, where only 26% of firms going public
were tech stocks, style-adjusted underperformance is not observable. In
contrast, in 1999–2000, when 72% IPO firms were tech stocks (and highly
speculative ones, at that), that cohort exhibited a very high degree of
underperformance.72

See Ritter and Welch (2002) at 1797, 1800. It should be pointed out, however, that in the
period from 1995-8, which the percentage of tech IPO firms rise from 23% in 1990-94 to 37%
(admittedly a small increase when compared to 1999-2000), style-adjusted underperformance
72
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Table 1, below, presents varying parameters and the resultant degree
of underperformance.
In any event, the point here is to illustrate that the existing data does
support the possibility that embedded put liability plays a significant role in
observed patterns of long-term underperformance. Furthermore, even if the
degree of underperformance caused by the embedded option effect is
relatively small, the effects upon the entrepreneur’s actions may still be very
significant. Suppose that the entrepreneur sells off the majority of the firm to
the shareholder, and retains a very small amount for himself. Even if the
magnitude of his holding is not great enough to seriously impact the overall
price of the publicly traded stock of the firm, the fact remains that his equity
position may be wiped out by Section 11 liability, and this will likely affect
his decision-making, both at the pre-IPO stage and thereafter in managing
the company. This is the focus of the next Part of this paper.
Table 1
Solvent Firm (B=C)

Insolvent Firm (B<C)

Probability of good
75.0%
state (g)

87.8%

90.9%

96.5%

75.0%

87.8%

90.9%

96.5%

Good
(G)

$6

$6

$6

$6

$6

$6

$6

$6

25.0%

12.2%

9.1%

3.5%

25.0%

12.2%

9.1%

3.5%

$2

$2

$2

$2

$3

$3

$3

$3

Ratio of settlement
value
to
market 25%
losses (S)

25%

25%

25%

25%

25%

25%

25%

Cost
of
the
project/shareholders' $2
investment (C)

$2

$2

$2

$4

$4

$4

$4

3.05%

2.28%

0.88%

4.69%

2.29%

1.71%

0.66%

state

Probability
state (1-g)

payoff
of

bad

Bad state payoff (B)

Underperformance

6.25%

was not observable. This may be due to the fact that the data is, as Ritter and Welch point
out, quite noisy, especially when adjusting for common risk factors. See id at 1820.
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IV.

Strategic Reactions to Embedded Put Liability
In the previous Part, I described one method that the entrepreneur can

utilize to limit his risk exposure, short term underpricing of the offering. In
this part, I will describe several more tactics that the entrepreneur may use,
each of which has the potential to destroy value, but which are rational given
the constraints of Section 11.
A.

Risk Reduction: Information and Investment Choice

The ostensible purpose of Section 11 is to encourage the entrepreneur
to invest in reducing the risk of the project being sold to the shareholder,
which Section 11 accomplishes by internalizing the firm’s risk upon the
entrepreneur even post-sale. (Note that the standard account—that the
purpose of Section 11 is to discourage fraud—is probably inaccurate.73) For
example, an entrepreneur who believes he has developed a medical device
with a high expected net present value, but with a great deal of uncertainty
surrounding that expectation, might invest in further test trials of the device
prior to starting mass production, which entails a very large investment.
Some investigation to reduce uncertainty can add value, even if costly, since
it provides an option to withhold investment if the project turns out to be a
dud;74 requiring some degree of investigation prior to sale to the shareholder
may be desirable if it is not feasible, due to agency costs, to undertake the
investigation postsale.75 The entrepreneur may be reluctant to engage in such
See, e.g., Sale at 434 for a statement of the traditional view. To the contrary, Section 11
almost certainly encourages “fraud”—that is, it encourages the entrepreneur to maximize
proceeds received by selling the firm at a price in excess of the net present value of its cash
flows. For instance, the firm described in Part III.B above does best under Section 11 by
selling to the shareholder at the price at the very top of the range of possible outcomes—in
that case, for a total firm valuation of $18. Other sections of the 1933 Act—such as Sections
17 and 24—do discourage fraud, of course, and are in tension with Section 11.
74 See Brealey and Myers (2003) at 268-78 for a discussion of real options.
75 That is, an entrepreneur who extracts private benefits from running the firm might decide
to invest the shareholder’s money in the project even if it turns out to be a dud, since the
alternative—giving the money back to the shareholder—does not provide those private
benefits.
73
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investigations prior to sale, since the entrepreneur may prefer to receive the
expected value of the firm, behind the veil of ignorance, rather than risk
being stuck with a low-value project. Here Section 11’s strict liability can play
a helpful role, since it shifts risk back onto the entrepreneur post-sale.76
However, the entrepreneur has substitutes to investigation (or investment in
disclosure accuracy) that can be quite destructive, and these substitutes are
the focus of the rest of this Part.
One such substitute is that the entrepreneur would shun high risk
projects—even at the expense of higher net present value—because he will be
ultimately unable to transfer the risk to shareholders. The entrepreneur in
Part III.B above would trade in the project with payoffs of $18 and $2 for a
project with payoffs of $14 and $4. The reason is the entrepreneur’s risk
aversion: the increase in the bad state payoff from $2 to $4 is worth more to
him than the decrease from $18 to $14 (total utility is 2.4 with the new
project, as opposed to 2 with the original project), even though the expected
value of the new project ($14/2 + $4/2 – $2 = $7) is less than the expected
value of the original project ($18/2 + $2/2 – $2 = $8). As the extreme case, the
entrepreneur would choose a sure thing of $6.01 over the original project
(expected value of $6.01 – $2 = $4.01), with a societal loss in value of $3.99.77
Obviously, this is not a useful tradeoff, since in this example the variance is
purely idiosyncratic risk, which, once again, the shareholder could diversify.

More narrowly tailored alternatives to strict liability are discussed in Part V.
I should point out that, even without the existence of the embedded §11 option, the
entrepreneur would still have some incentive to choose lower variance projects since he may
not be able to diversify completely due to his large ownership stake. However, this would be
of a lesser degree than when §11 liability is in effect, and we can calculate what the
difference in social welfare would be. With no §11 liability, where total utility of the original
project is 2.53, the entrepreneur would require a sure thing of at least $6.40, which
represents a loss of only $1.60 from the project’s expected value of $8. Comparing the break
even sure-thing in the non-§11 scenario of $6.40 with the $4.01 break even in the §11
scenario, we can see in our example that the imposition of §11 liability has the potential to
destroy an extra $2.39 worth of value.
76
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Thus, the investment in risk reduction may well come at the expense of
actual value.78
B.

Insurance and Hedging

We might suppose that the entrepreneur, recognizing his risk
exposure, would want to hedge his risk by purchasing derivatives or liability
insurance. This would reduce his exposure, and reduce the distortion in his
behavior that Section 11 might otherwise cause. But does an insurance
market exist that could insure firm outcomes? Given that the reason many
firms go public is to diversify risk and to satisfy capital requirements that the
private market cannot, it seems doubtful.
While there is a ready counterparty for a hedging transaction in the
form of the shareholders—the firm could simply purchase back the puts from
them—this would likely fall afoul of the securities laws or SEC regulation,
since it would amount to an agreement on the part of the shareholders not to
sue the firm. Of course, as discussed in Part III.C, the firm could do the
functional equivalent of buying back the puts from initial allocatees by
bribing them not to sue with initial underpricing; this is, unfortunately,
illegal.79
Alternatively, the firm could purchase insurance against liability. In
practice, this done to a limited extent with directors’ and officers’ (D&O)
insurance, although the coverage appears to be partial, at best.80 More
general issuer’s liability insurance does not seem to exist. It would not be
From an ex post perspective, it is also possible that the entrepreneur would undertake
higher risk, lower value projects where the firm has performed badly and the entrepreneur
expects to be sued, in a situation analogous to the conflict between debt and equity where a
firm faces insolvency.
79 Among other things, this could be seen as a scheme or artifice to defraud under Section 17
of the Securities Act. Both the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act specifically
prohibit disclaimer or waiver of liability under the Acts. See Securities Act Section 13;
Securities Exchange Act Section 29.
80 Alexander reports that D&O insurance is partial in settlements (which are, of course,
generally for smaller amounts than trial awards), with issuers paying 50 to 80 percent of
settlement values themselves. See Alexander (1991), at 572.
78
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that surprising if the insurance market lacks the capability to fully insure
IPO firms, since this would be equivalent to selling all the firm’s downside to
the insurer, and since one of the reasons for going public in the first place is
that private buyers lack the capacity to buy all the firm’s shares.81 Finally,
the SEC’s marked hostility to insurance and indemnification also limits such
practices.82
C.

Managerial Entrenchment

If the entrepreneur faces the risk of having his shareholdings wiped
out by the liability put in the event of subsequent declines in share price, and
since share price declines increase the likelihood, ceteris paribus, that the
entrepreneur would lose his job as manager of the firm, the entrepreneur
faces the daunting possibility of finding himself not just poor, but also
unemployed. One way of mitigating this outcome, then, is to implement
entrenchment mechanisms that allow the entrepreneur to keep his job as
manager even when the firm performs poorly. A range of options are open to
the entrepreneur here. Arlen and Talley (2004) describe overt and covert
forms of entrenchment and, interestingly, point out that managers generally
employ overt entrenchment forms—done with shareholder knowledge and
approval, often at or enabled at the IPO stage—rather than covert forms.
This implies that shareholders and the entrepreneur see these entrenchment
devices as joint-welfare maximizing; one possible explanation for why this
would be so is the risk-shifting model developed in this paper; entrenchment
may lead to an optimal outcome given that the Securities Act has relegated
us to a second-best world.
Interestingly, a study by Daines and Klausner reports a positive
correlation between the shareholdings of management and the use of antitakeover provisions. This is consistent with the hypothesis that as
That is, if the entrepreneur can find a private buyer for the firm’s downside, there may be
little reason to access public markets in the first place.
82 See, e.g., Items 510, 512, and 702 of Regulation S-K.
81
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entrepreneurs are less able to cash out of the firm, meaning that they are
increasingly exposed to idiosyncratic risk, they would increasingly invest in
anti-takeover technologies to hedge that risk.
D.

Removal of Assets from the Firm

The entrepreneur can attempt to remove assets from the firm or
liquidate his stake in the firm. This has the effect of by-passing the Section
11 put: if the entrepreneur can take money out of the firm such that the firm
is unable to pay the put when the shareholder attempts to exercise it, then
the put may as well not exist.83
There are two principal ways in which the entrepreneur can go about
removing his capital. First, the entrepreneur could retain sole ownership of
firm assets, and lease those assets to the firm to undertake the project. In our
numerical example, supposing that these assets have a value of $2 in either
state of the world, the project’s payoffs go from being $18/$2 in the good/bad
state to $16/$0 once the assets are removed. The Section 11 put is now
valueless. The shareholder, realizing this, will demand a greater percentage
of the firm for her investment of $2 (i.e., the price paid for the shares is
lower), but at the end of the day the shareholder is no worse off.
One problem with this approach, however, in that there may be value
in the firm’s owning the assets. For instance, if the possibility exists that the
entrepreneur would be tempted to act opportunistically and withdraw the use
of the asset from the firm in the event that a better opportunity comes along,
the shareholders may be less willing to invest in the firm. Another example is
that the entrepreneur’s retention of vital assets allows the entrepreneur to

One limitation on this approach is that Section 11 extends liability to the firm’s
management, and Section 15 extends liability to control persons. This liability is, however,
subject to a due diligence defense, and the entrepreneur would be able to escape direct
liability by meeting what is essentially a negligence standard. See Section 11(b) of the
Securities Act.
83
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entrench himself in the management of the firm.84 In short, the
entrepreneur’s retention of assets imposes an additional agency cost that may
reduce overall value.
A second possibility is that the entrepreneur could seek to cash out of
the firm entirely. He could do this by selling all of his stock to the
shareholder, thus eliminating his exposure to idiosyncratic risk and allowing
diversification into other projects. In such a case, the Section 11 put right is
valueless, since the shareholder will own the entire firm herself and there
would be no residual stakeholder to put the firm back to.85 Alternatively, the
entrepreneur may have the firm borrow from a bank, using the shareholder’s
equity as collateral, in order to cash out the entrepreneur. For example, the
entrepreneur in the $18/$2 scenario could have the firm borrow $2 from the
bank which the firm pays to the entrepreneur (this could be styled as a buyback of some of the entrepreneur’s equity or as a purchase of assets that the
entrepreneur has retained ownership of). This reduces payoffs to $16/$0,
erasing the value of the put, which means that the shareholder would ex ante
pay a lower price for the firm’s shares. Once again, this does not necessarily
make the shareholder worse off since the price has adjusted accordingly.86
However, more debt increases the likelihood of insolvency and, hence, also
the expected costs of financial distress.87
A more fundamental problem is that where the entrepreneur is going
to stay on to manage the firm, a high ownership stake on his part would help
to properly align his interests with those of the shareholder. The imposition
See Arlen and Talley (2003) for a description of how firm founders can entrench
themselves in management by retaining ownership of important assets. For example, Donna
Karan’s retention of the DKNY brand name allows her to defeat any prospective takeover
offers.
85 As above, the shareholder can still sue the entrepreneur under Section 11, but this suit is
subject to the entrepreneur’s due diligence defense.
86 This does require, of course, that the shareholder realizes that the entrepreneur is going to
do this ahead of time.
87 See Brealey and Myers (2003) at 497-510. The risk of insolvency increases the cost of
borrowing because of the costliness of bankruptcies and the unwillingness of creditors,
workers, and other third parties to do business with a firm that is likely to become insolvent
in the future.
84
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of the Section 11 put option makes the entrepreneur want to reduce his
stakeholding in the firm more than he otherwise would, exacerbating agency
costs.
E.

Reduced Information

It is customary in securities law practice to think of risk factor
disclosure as limiting the seller’s liability by providing an insurance policy of
sorts; the court-created “bespeaks caution” doctrine allows the issuer to
escape liability by describing risks that may subsequently materialize. On
the other side of the same coin, disclosure of positive information can be quite
risky: positive disclosure increases the probability that the firm will make
what, in hindsight at least, appears to be a material misstatement or
omission. So firms may wish to disclose less positive information, and more
negative information.
There is, of course, a cost to this strategy: by reducing positive
disclosure and increasing negative disclosure, the issuing firm suffers an
asymmetric information problem where investors are unable to determine
whether the firm is of good or bad quality. It is not clear whether, and in
what circumstances, the advantages of reduced liability from nondisclosure
can outweigh the costs of adverse selection and the consequent higher cost of
capital.
One unambiguous alternative, however, is that the firm can invest in
disclosure “arbitrage,” substituting a low liability form of disclosure for a high
liability form. Spindler (2005) presents such a model of this, where the issuer
signals information to the market through the underwriter’s research
analyst, effectively substituting fraud liability for strict liability.88 Other
possibilities may include, though they are not without significant problems or
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costs, a pre-emptive offering,89 investment in high reputation underwriters,90
or covertly leaking additional information to the market.91
F.

Firm-Level Diversification and “Empire-Building”

Finally, given that the entrepreneur is going to be subject to an
increased level of idiosyncratic risk under Section 11 liability, we would
expect the entrepreneur (assuming he retains management of the firm) to
engage in an increased degree of firm level diversification, or “empirebuilding.” Because the entrepreneur’s wealth is tied up in the idiosyncratic
fortunes of his firm, the entrepreneur may seek to have the firm diversify by
buying other firms or expanding into different lines of business, providing a
natural hedge against bad state outcomes.
This activity is not necessarily destructive of value (after all, combined
firms sometimes yield synergies or economies of scale), but it seems
inadvisable compared to allowing diversification at the shareholder level.
First, purchases of other firms entail significant transaction costs, which the
shareholder could accomplish more cheaply by simply buying the other firms’
traded stock. Second, if diseconomies or anti-synergies exist between the
acquiring and acquired firms such that the merger is value-destroying, the
entrepreneur may proceed regardless, because his gain from diversification
outweighs his share of the resultant loss. Third, diversification at the firm

This entails going public in a small offering so as to become a public reporting company,
and then doing a larger offering once the market has acquired more information.
90 As discussed supra at n. __, underwriter reputation is of dubious efficacy in
pricing/liability matters.
91 For example, the issuing firm could tell the initial allocatees such information at the road
show. This is technically subject to strict liability under Section 12, though this may be
weakened by evidentiary difficulties in proving a case based on roadshow disclosure and by
the fact that roadshow attendees are repeat players and thus subject to future sanctions
(e.g., exclusion from future allocations) if they sue. The issuer and the investors may be able
to approximate the “right” level of disclosure liability in this way. One problem with this
approach, however, is that these communications are not observable to investors in the
market at large (i.e., those investors not present at the roadshow), who would have no
remedy based upon this disclosure, and who would therefore not rely upon it in making an
investment decision. See Spindler (2005).
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level reduces the ability of the individual investor to tailor her portfolio as
best suits her: while she may wish to own firm A and not firm B, she may
have no choice in the matter if firm A acquires firm B (assuming appropriate
derivative instruments do not exist92).
V.

Conclusion
This paper has shown that the Securities Act’s standard of strict

liability for IPO disclosure has the effect of inefficiently allocating
diversifiable risk to the entrepreneur, resulting in a distortion of the
entrepreneur’s behavior. Such distortions include generally value-destroying
activities, such as entrenchment, initial underpricing, empire-building, endruns around disclosure rules, lower-value project choice, and asset removal or
partitioning. At the same time, this paper demonstrates that the Securities
Act may play a significant role in the perceived long-term underperformance
of IPO firms, by embedding a put option whose value declines over time.
While such a disclosure liability regime may lead the entrepreneur to invest
more in accurate disclosure, this potential benefit is uncertain as the
entrepreneur has substitute responses at his disposal—the above valuedestroying behaviors—that may minimize his liability more efficiently.
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